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DISCOVERIES AS OCCASIONED PRODUCTIONS

ABSTRACT
The current paper represents a methodological proposal. It seeks to address the
question of how one might recognize a discovery as a discovery without knowing in
advance what is available to be discovered. We propose a solution and demonstrate it
using data from a study previously reported by Roschelle (1992). Roschelle
investigated two students’ discovery of certain abstract features of Newtonian mechanics
while working within a computer-based microworld, the Envisioning Machine. We employ
an approach we term discovery-as-occasioned-production to re-examine his data. Such
an approach proceeds stepwise from the identification of some matter discovered,
working backwards to see just where that matter entered the conversation and, then,
finally, tracing from that point forward to illuminate how the proposal for a possible
discovery was ultimately transformed into a discovery achieved. The notion of “evident
vagueness,” borrowed from Garfinkel, Lynch, and Livingston’s (1981) account of the
discovery of an optical pulsar, emerges as an important feature of our analysis.
Following Garfinkel (2002), we present our findings as a “tutorial problem” and offer a
suggestion for how a program of practice studies in the learning sciences might be
pursued.

Keywords: scientific discovery, ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis
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In a now classic article, Roschelle (1992) provided a detailed analysis of the
interaction of two high school students, ‘Dana’ and ‘Carol,’ as they worked together at a
computer. The students were working with a computer-based, simulation environment
known as the Envisioning Machine which Roschelle developed. As he (1991) described
it, “The Envisioning Machine (EM) is a direct-manipulation simulation of the concepts of
velocity and acceleration” (p. 25). To help users of the program develop an appreciation
of these concepts, he also developed a set of problems, termed “EM Challenges.”
Solving the challenges in each case involved conducting experiments within the
simulation environment. The activity incorporated the pedagogical strategy of discovery
learning. Roschelle (1991) argued, “[I]n a discovery learning situation, students take
control of most decisions regarding how and what to learn.” For that reason, it “yields
the most data about the impasses students face in learning scientific concepts, and the
resources they have available for overcoming them” (p. 29).
Roschelle videotaped the students as they performed their experiments and solved
the posed challenges. His report was based on a close analysis of these recordings.
He (1992) described how they were able to “construct increasingly sophisticated
approximations to scientific concepts collaboratively, through gradual refinement of
ambiguous, figurative, partial meanings” (p. 237). This was accomplished, he observed,
“through cycles of displaying, confirming, and repairing shared meanings” (p. 237)
leading eventually to “convergent conceptual change.” This entailed three elements:
“(a) a large conceptual change from their previous concept, (b) a qualitative
approximation to the scientific meaning of acceleration, and (c) a closely shared
meaning between one another” (p. 238). His analysis, therefore, focused on two forms
of convergence—the degree to which Dana and Carol’s “shared meanings for
conversations, concepts, and experiences” (p. 236) came together and the degree to
which these mutual understandings came to align with a physicist’s notion of
acceleration. In sum, the EM activity was designed and resourced to produce a certain
discovery and Roschelle’s analysis focused on exploring just how that discovery was
achieved in the case of Dana and Carol’s work together at the computer.i The current
paper re-examines Roschelle’s data using a different analytic framing. Our purpose is
not to challenge Roschelle’s findings, but rather to explore our repertoire of methods for
studying the processes of discovery and seek to expand it.
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The work to be presented here lies at the confluence of several literatures. The
first, known as “laboratory studies” is comprised of ethnographic accounts of what Star
(1985) described as the “homely exigencies of daily scientific work” (p. 391). This
research literature, which has its roots in anthropology and sociology, seeks to
document how scientific inquiry gets done (see, for example, Knorr-Cetna, 1981; Latour
& Woolgar, 1979; Lynch, 1985; Traweek, 1988). These studies have “attempted to
suspend a priori understandings of what science is while examining particular cases of
observation, experiment, and theoretical controversy” (Lynch, 1993, p. 113). A
persistent finding is that there are “many levels of interpretive, interactive, and
instrumental mediation between scientists’ accounts and the ‘natural’ objects and facts
described in those accounts” (ibid, p. 92).
A second literature with high relevance to our current investigation arose from
Garfinkel’s (1986) call for a program of descriptive research focusing on occupations and
professions. Garfinkel is the founder of a school within contemporary sociology known
as Ethnomethodology, a movement that takes as its foundational topic the vernacular
methods by which members of society produce their world as understood (Garfinkel,
1967). Garfinkel’s interest was in what he termed the “quiddity” or “just whatness” of
work as it is performed. This eventually led to a series of ethnomethodologicallyinformed studies examining different forms of work including: mathematical proof
(Livingston, 1986), jazz improvisation (Sudnow, 2001), policing (Bittner, 1967), and
doing the “convict code” (Wieder, 1974). Garfinkel’s interest in the workplace and the
literature of laboratory studies intersect in what have been termed “ethnomethodological
studies of scientific work” (Lynch, 1993, p. 113). A particularly well-known example is
Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston’s (1981) report focusing on the practitioners’ discourse
leading up to a scientific discovery.
The current paper is centrally concerned with the processes whereby some matter
previously unknown becomes, through the practical and embodied actions of local
participants transformed into some thing there for the knowing. But herein lies a
puzzle—how is it that we are able to talk about some matter being discovered while still
engaged in the work of discovering it? The approach taken in our re-analysis of
Roschelle’s data is practice-based, which is to say that it is oriented toward offering a
descriptive account of just how a discovery was actually done. But this, in itself, does
not distinguish it from Roschelle’s approach, which was exemplary in its orientation to
users’ practices. Second, our approach is microanalytic. It focuses upon the details of
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talk-in-interaction (Sacks, 1992; Levinson, 1983) as well as other embodied aspects of
communication (see, for example, Jordan & Henderson, 1995; McDermott, 1976;
Goodwin, 2003; Erickson, 2004) drawing, in particular, on prior findings in Conversation
Analysis (CA).ii It might be thought of metaphorically as a magnifying glass for studying
the details of discovery’s work. Our vision is enhanced, not optically, but rather
procedurally through fine-grained transcription and repeated viewings/hearings of
produced recordings. Examining practice at a higher level of resolution permits an
appreciation of subtle features that might be missed in simple field observation. This
too, however, fails to distinguish our approach from that of Roschelle. In investigating
the first form of convergent conceptual change described in his article, Roschelle
attended closely to the methods by which Dana and Carol worked to coordinate their
understandings.
Our concern, however, arises with regard to the second form of conceptual
convergence he discussed. The EM was designed to teach the theory of mechanics.
Roschelle’s analysis focused, therefore, on whether or not the users of the environment
developed conceptualizations of velocity and acceleration that matched those of
properly-trained physicists. In re-analyzing Roschelle’s data, we adopt a different
framing. Rather than starting with an expectation of what should be discovered, we treat
the object of discovery as something that needs itself to be dis-covered within the
participants’ unfolding interaction. We treat the matter discovered, therefore, not as a
thing given or preordained, but rather as an occasioned production. iii
As analysts, we arrive on the scene with many things taken as understood (e.g.,
that the participants are students, that they are doing a lesson, that the purpose of the
lesson is to teach Newtonian mechanics, etc.). Rather than use these understandings
as a resource for explaining the participants’ behavior, however, we make the ways in
which these things are made understood the topic of our inquiry. Our task then
becomes one of working out in detail how these understandings relate to observed
practice. Sacks (1963) established the ground rules for this kind of investigation with the
admonition, “whatever we take as subject must be described; nothing we take as
subject can appear as part of our descriptive apparatus” (p. 2).
When studying a discovery as an occasioned production, the frame of analysis is
developed within the analysis itself. We begin by locating something that is
demonstrably treated by participants as a new understanding. This event marks the
close of our analytic episode, but we still need to determine where it opens. To do so,
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we must trace backwards to see where the matter so treated first arose within the
participants’ developing talk-in-interaction. We refer to this first appearance as a
proposal-for-a-possible-discovery to highlight its initially tenuous status. Such proposals
are often only recognizable in retrospect. Having established the scope of the episode,
the deliberate work of systematically tracing the transformation from a produced
proposal to an achieved discovery begins.
Before turning to Dana and Carol’s discovery, we will first look at another discovery,
the discovery of an optical pulsar by two astrophysicists. This discovery had been
described in the report mentioned earlier by Garfinkel et al. (1981). Their account had
an unusual structure, however. The body of their report laid out certain key notions by
which an analysis of the discovery might be undertaken, but the analysis itself was left,
by and large, as an exercise for the reader. The necessary resources for carrying out it
were provided in the form of various exhibits and transcripts attached as appendices.
We take up this exercise in the section that follows. Following that, we will then
examine the materials from Roschelle’s study using the approach used to analyze the
optical pulsar discovery and drawing on key notions taken from the Garfinkel et al.
report. Garfinkel (2002) referred to instructive exercises of the type that we are dealing
with here as “tutorial problems” (p. 145). We will return to the topic of tutorial problems
later.

DISCOVERING AN OPTICAL PULSAR
To study how a discovery gets done, one must first determine exactly what was
discovered. With reference to the discovery described by Garfinkel et al., however, this
is easily done. In 1969, a report with the following title was published in Nature:
“Discovery of Optical Signals from Pulsar NP 0532” (Cocke, Disney, Taylor, 1969). It
proclaims a discovery-achieved and plainly summarizes just what that discovery might
have been. The report was published on Feb. 8, the manuscript received on Jan. 28. It
was a public announcement that something had happened. But when and where?
Accounts of discoveries are usually based on participants’ recollections (Woolgar,
1976). In the case of the discovery of an optical pulsar on the night of January 16,
however, there happened to be an audio recording of the actual event. Captured on it
were the voices of three participants: John Cocke and Michael Disney, astrophysicists,
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and Robert McCallester, the “night assistant” at the Steward Observatory (Center for the
History of Physics, 2003). If one were to ask, what were they doing on that particular
night in on the mountain in the Arizona desert, the answer would not be ‘making a
discovery.’ Though something was indeed discovered, their orientation to their actions
as a discovery only emerged later. We might say instead that they were ‘being
astronomers’ or that they were ‘doing the work of professional astronomy.’ This would
certainly be a fair description. Both Cocke and Disney held doctorates in astrophysics
and McCallester was a knowledgeable technician. They were, in short, each and all
properly credentialed to carry out the work at hand.
An alternative treatment of their activity might highlight its tool-mediated aspects.
We might, for example, employ ‘operating a telescope’ as a useful gloss for what they
were doing together. ‘Optical pulsar’ is a name for something that emits pulses of light.
A lighthouse, seen from afar, is an everyday example. Strobes and fluorescent lighting
are also optical pulsars, though in the latter case you cannot visually detect the
pulsations. At the time that the Cocke et al. report was issued, other astronomers had
already discovered that certain objects in space operated as pulsars. This activity had
only been detected in the radio range, however (Woolgar, 1976). The research carried
out by Cocke and his colleagues represented a shift in instrumentation from the use of
large and relatively imprecise radio telescopes to the use of an optical telescope.
Optical telescopes suitable for professional astronomy are usually situated in remote
places where the nights are clear and there is little locally-produced light to interfere with
observations. It was the reflector telescope at Kitt Peak, therefore, that brought them to
that particular desert mountaintop on the night in question.
To detect pulsations in the optical range, however, required more than just a
telescope. Unless pulsing very slowly, optical pulsations are not visible to the human
eye. Cocke and Disney needed some means of repeatedly folding time back onto itself
in order to make the pulsing observable. They met this requirement using a piece of
equipment, the “computer of average transients” (CAT), designed by Donald Taylor.iv It
displayed on an oscilloscope screen “cycles of the pulsation waveform in phase” (Cocke
et al., 1969, p. 525, see Fig. 1). The team was not just operating a telescope, therefore,
but an elaborate instrumental assembly designed with a particular question in mind.v
There is contention for observation time on a professional telescope and
researchers must justify their requests on the basis of what might be learned. To get
time on the telescope at Steward Observatory, Disney and Cocke had had to submit a
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research proposal. In it they had described a plan to “search known white dwarfs for
optical pulsations” (Center for History of Physics, 2003). The submitted proposal,
therefore, tied their practical activities to an ongoing conversation within the disciplinary
community. This also offers the basis for a new and more concise characterization of
their activity, that of searching for an optical pulsar.
<<Insert Figure 1 about here>>
Though they were engaged in a search using the approved tools and methods of
their profession, no one, including Cocke and Disney, really expected them to find
anything. Their contemporaries entertained serious doubts that there were any optical
pulsars out there to be found (Center for the History of Physics, 2003). And even if they
did exist, Cocke and Disney were not well-positioned to be their discoverers. Both were
theoretical physicists with little practical experience in the observatory (Center for History
of Physics, 2003). They were also not optimally equipped. The 0.9-meter reflector
telescope at Steward Observatory upon which they were to conduct their studies was
both old and, by contemporary standards, disappointingly small. State-of-the-art
astronomy had moved up to larger and more sophisticated devices. Given their junior
status, however, and their general lack of experience, they had decided against applying
for time on a more powerful instrument. By the night of January 16, Disney and Cocke
had already spent five nights on Kitt Peak and had found nothing.

EVIDENCE OF A DISCOVERY-ACHIEVED
Their night’s work on January 16 was segmented into a series of runs. Each run
addressed the question of whether or not optical pulsars exist in a very constrained way.
It represented an observation at a particular location in space at a particular frequency
range at a particular level of gain, etc. They began their evening’s work with Run #17
and ended with Run #33. Partial transcripts for Runs #18 and #22 can be found in
Appendix B.vi Transcripts of additional runs can be found in Garfinkel et al. (1981).
By Run #22 something had occurred. Something had been noticed in Run #18 and
it was detected again in Runs #19 and #20. It was not until Run #22, however, that it
was fully established as a discovered thing. By Run #22, the optical pulsar had shifted
from something being sought to “something in-hand, available for further elaboration
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and analysis, and essentially finished” (Garfinkel et al., 1981, p. 156). We encounter the
following exchange midway through this run:

Excerpt 1
23

Disney: We’ll have to figure out what the hell this

24

means now.

25
26

(1.0)
Cocke:

27
28

Ya::h. (0.5) HUH huh. (0.3) Theoretically?
(0.5)

Disney: Well- we- well- wa- we should be able to work

29

ou:t (.) how many photons are coming in per

30

second: to this pulse.

(Correct)?

(Yup.)

31

Cocke:

32

Cocke:

33

Disney:

34

Cocke:

35

Disney: = Uh:::: and that will should be and that will

The bloody size of the pulse.
Well, we should be uh huh. =
give us some idear of the luminos:ity of this

36
37
38

Uh huh

object.
Cocke:

Uh huh.

An explicit connection is made here between “this object” (line 37), the discovered
pulsar, and its local manifestation, the data plot visible on the CRT display before them.
“This object”, of course, refers to the “independent Galilean pulsar” (Garfinkel et al.,
1981, p. 138), the thing for which they have been searching. Disney asserts that a
property of the pulsar (i.e., luminosity) can be estimated from the size of the visible
curve. His assertion treats the pulsar, therefore, as an accomplished fact. A feature
previously detected on the display is now understood in a new way; the optical pulsar
has been “thingified” (Rawls, 2008, p. 4).
Shortly after this exchange Disney and Cocke notified their collaborator, Taylor.
They repeated the observations together on the following night. The day following that,
a telegram was sent to the International Astronomical Union requesting confirmation of
their finding by other astronomers.vii Their object of discussion, therefore, had been
transformed from a possibility to a confirmable and then confirmed reality. But how was
this transformation actually realized?
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Locating a Proposal-for-a-Possible-Discovery
To locate where the possibility of the ‘independent Galilean pulsar’ enters the
conversation, we must trace back to Run #18. Figure 1 provides a reproduction of the
CRT display of Taylor’s CAT device approximately midway into this run. The following
exchange is heard:
Excerpt 2
13

Disney: We’ve got a bleeding ↑pulse here.

14
15

(2.0)
Cocke:

16
17

(4.5)
Cocke:

18
19

↑He::y.

Wo::w!
(1.2)

Cocke:→ You don’t suppose that’s really it do you?

20

(1.8)

21

Cocke:

It ca:n’t be.

22

Disney: (Sure) it’s right bang in the middle of the

23

period. (Look), I mean right bang in the middle

24

of the sca::le. It really looks something to me

25

at the moment.

26

(0.8)

27

Cocke:

Hmmm.

Drew (1984) discussed what he termed “speaker reportings” in the context of invitation
responses. He noted that, “the speaker is officially responsible only for the reporting,
and not for what is made from (detected in) that” (p. 137). As he elaborated, “By just
detailing some activities or planned activities (or other circumstances), speakers
withhold officially taking positions about the possible implications of their reportings” (p.
137). Though Disney’s turn in line 13 draws attention to something (“a bleeding pulse”)
available on the CAT screen to both Disney and Cocke,viii he stops short of specifying
the possible upshot of his noticing. It does set the stage, however, for what is to follow.
An emergent pattern on the screen has now been given a name and has been
made available as a discussable. A pulse is not a pulsar, however, and Disney’s
announcement is not quite a proposal-for-a possible-discovery. A pulse signifies an
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emerging pattern that could be evidence of the thing sought, but could also be artifact.
Cocke’s response (line 15) delivered after a pause is non-committal. It acknowledges
Disney’s report and registers surprise. After a longer pause Cocke upgrades his
appraisal. It is not until line 19, however, that the possibility is raised that what they are
looking at might represent evidence of an optical pulsar. Cocke’s utterance marks a
transition point in their activity, therefore. Through it, the work of the night shifts from a
search for an unknown to that of potentially confirming something found. It heralds a
discovery possibly to come, but without actually declaring one. It is only made
recognizeable as a discovery-relevant noticing in retrospect after we find sometime later
that they have come to an agreement that what they were seeing in this moment was
something new.
His utterance is constructed as an inquiry and would appear (“you don’t suppose”)
to address the listener’s state of belief. It can be seen to be doing more than simply
seeking information, however. Koshik (2002) has written about yes/no questions like
these. She has suggested that such questions may be “designed, in the first instance,
not to display an expectation for a certain answer, but to display the epistemic stance of
the speaker, sometimes acting more like assertions than questions” (p. 1855). That is,
though the construction of a “you don’t suppose” query might seem to display a
preference for a negative response, the query can in some circumstances actually work
as an affirming statement. Koshik (2005) refers to these “grammatically negative
questions” (p. 12) that function as assertions as “reversed polarity questions (RPQs)” (p.
13). She also notes that the intensifier really plays a role in reversing the polarity of a
statement. The absence of a response in line 20 might be construed as evidence that
Cocke’s utterance was heard in just this way as an assertion, not a question.
But if Cocke’s utterance states a claim, what sort of a claim does it make? The
assertion embedded in Cocke’s utterance is that “that’s really it.” But how are we to
make sense of such a double pronominal construction? Pronouns are not just a
shorthand method of reference. In his lectures on “tying rules”, Sacks (1992) explored
the function of pronominals. If Speaker A names some matter using a noun phrase and
Speaker B replies, but refers to the matter using a pronoun such as it or that, Sacks
argued the second utterance was “tied,” through this usage, to the first. He proposed,
therefore, that pronoun usage is first and foremost a mechanism for doing
understanding. He wrote,
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Tying an utterance to an utterance is the basic means of showing that you
understood that utterance. The elaboration of tying means that one can, in due
course, have a way of showing that you understood any given utterance that
went before. But it’s showing that in a very special and interesting way. Indeed
the only workable way. (Vol. 1, p. 718)
Can we analyze Cocke’s “that’s really it” in terms of what it treats as understood?
The word that can be used to serve a variety of grammatical functions in English.
Here it serves as the subject of the Cocke claim, but in such a slot it could be used at
least two different ways. Used demonstratively, the pronoun would be accompanied by
some sort of embodied gesture, a point or a nod or a directed gaze. If such a gesture
was produced here, however, we would have no way of knowing it, since we have only
an audio recording upon which to construct our analysis. Alternatively, it could be used
anaphorically. Used in this way, the recipient would have to locate a grounding
expression in the local (usually prior) text. There is no such expression, however, within
the speaker’s current turn at talk nor in his two prior turns (lines 15 and 17). We do have
a candidate in Disney’s prior turn, however, and it is the noun phrase “a bleeding pulse.”
Whether it is used demonstratively or anaphorically, we hear that as tying Cocke’s
utterance to Disney’s prior noticing and acknowledging the feature of the display that
Disney has made relevant. His “a bleeding pulse” and Cocke’s that are heard as coreferencing a feature of the display. Cocke’s proposal is assembled, therefore, using
components of Disney’s reporting. But what then does it reference and what are the
implications of its use here?
In English, is is a coupling verb.ix It may be used for a variety of purposes, e.g.,
asserting the subject and object to be identical, declaring the subject to be an instance
or subset of the object, assigning a property to the subject, etc. To be felicitous,
however, the joining must convey some news—the coupling verb must bring together
two things that were formerly seen as distinct in order for the conversation to progress.
That would suggest in this case that whatever was referred to by it must in some way be
different from whatever was referenced by that. If that referenced something available
on the CAT screen, however, what is to serve as the antecedent for it? There are no
likely candidates in evidence. So the pronominal reference might have the appearance
of being defective.
We should begin by noting, however, that, though it is used without apparent
antecedent, it does not appear to pose a problem of understanding for the participants.
This kind of pronoun usage has been described previously. Two treatments are
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particularly helpful to understanding the case at hand. The first is Goodwin’s (1996)
notion of a “prospective indexical.”x An indexical is a term whose sense is derived
through reference to its environment of use. Pro-terms like he, she, we and it are
indexicals that conventionally reference something previously described. Prospective
indexicals are indexicals that instead of referencing back, refer forward. Goodwin (1996)
wrote:
Hearers must engage in an active, somewhat problematic process of
interpretation in order to uncover the specification of the indexical that will enable
them to build appropriate subsequent action at a particular place. Moreover this
analysis is not static, complete as soon as the prospective indexical is heard, but
is instead a dynamic process that extends through time as subsequent talk and
the interpretive framework provided by the prospective indexical mutually
elaborate each other. (p. 384-385)
A related treatment is attributed to Harvey Sacks. Sacks (1978), in his analysis of the
telling of a dirty joke, discussed “a something-or-other ‘it’ which has no prior-named
referent” (p. 256).xi The Sacksian IT, like a prospective indexical, projects a future
resolution. Garfinkel et al. wrote:
[I]t is produced, recognized, and understood before it has a definiteness of sense
or reference. ‘IT’ is used and oriented in that and in the way that it has no sense
or reference, and thus as a way a sense and reference is achieved for ‘IT’, and
as a condition under which a sense, definitely, clearly, after all, etc., is achieved.
(p. 157)
The thing that was to eventually become the “independent Galilean pulsar,” was at
the time of Cocke’s discovery proposal something else, something “evidently vague” (p.
135). It was a thing still unformed and untested, a thing that “could go away and be gone
forever” (p. 138). Garfinkel et al. refer to this still unformed thing as the “evidently vague
IT.” Whereas the Sacksian IT refers to a feature of language-in-use, Garfinkel et al. use
the “evidently-vague IT” to refer to the actual thing in the process of being discovered,
the thing that will eventually evolve from “an object-of-sorts with neither demonstrable
sense nor reference” (p. 135) in Run #18 to being, in Run #22, “a perspectival object
with yet to be ‘found’ and measured properties of luminosity, pulse amplitude, exact
frequency, and exact location” (p. 156). They place scare quotes around ‘found’ here
because the “evidently vague IT” designates the thing being sought before the
astrophysicists have fully convinced themselves that anything has been found or,
indeed, that there is anything to find. It is, in their words, an “object-not-yet” (p. 135),
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something brought into being through their membered practices of inquiry. They
continued:
By the end of the night’s work [the optically discovered pulsar] is a ‘relatively
finished object.’ But early in the evening [it] is not only not finished; it is
witnessably vague. It has the properties of a Sacksian ‘IT. ’ (p. 157)
A transcript of the early part of Run #18 was presented in Appendix 3 (“First
Noticings”) of the Garfinkel et al. report. They note:
After Disney’s announcement of the ‘pulse’, he and Cocke mention developinglyobserved ‘properties’, such as ‘it’s right bang in the middle of the period’; ‘it really
looks like something (from here) at the moment’; ‘it’s growing too’; and ‘it’s
growing up the side a bit too’. The optically-discovered pulsar is referenced as a
locally embedded phenomenon whose ‘properties’ are come upon in a
developing sequence of locally pointed noticings. (p. 149)
No special attention seemed to be paid to Cocke’s, “You don’t suppose that’s really it, do
you?” (line 19) here. But not only did the witnessably vague object of their inquiries
exhibit the properties of a Sacksian IT, Cocke actually employed this very structure to
describe that object. This is an example of a place where Garfinkel, Lynch and
Livingston provided the conceptual framing for the analysis, but left it as an exercise to
the reader to apply the analytic terms to the data.
Though the referent of it in line 19 may only be specified vaguely, that does not
mean that it could be anything at all. When Cocke asks, “You don’t suppose that’s really
it, do you?” the possibilities for what he might be talking about are still pretty limited.
Garfinkel et al. wrote, “It is astonishingly clear in the tape that the possibility of their
discovery and achievement inhabits their work from its outset” (p. 140). If what Cocke
and his colleagues were doing that night was in fact engaging in a search as we argued
earlier, then the object of their search, an optical pulsar, is central to the activity in which
they are jointly involved. Indeed, the activity and the possibility of the object are coconstitutive. The relevance of the optical pulsar was built, therefore, into the very activity
that they were performing together. One might even say that it was omni-relevant within
that activity. By referencing the object of their search in his query, Cocke linked their
actions to the wider concerns of the research community of which Cocke and Disney
were members.
It, therefore, not only tied forward to the object to be discovered, but also back to
the scientific goals that motivated the search and that brought them together in the
desert on that particular night. It had both a prospective and retrospective orientation. It
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functions here as a double entendre of sorts, not in the usual sense of simultaneously
indexing multiple referents, but rather co-referencing a common object, but doing so via
different paths. In this way, it is suspended in a referential web that simultaneously
projects and recalls the object of interest. It is an indefinite pronoun that provides its own
“interpretive framework” (Goodwin, 1996).
In its construction Cocke’s noticing gives subtle treatment to what is known and
what is yet to be understood. The question remains, however, why formulate the matter
quite this way? Wouldn’t it be easier to simply say, “That might be an optical pulsar” or
even “Look an optical pulsar”? By formulating the possible discovery as a RPQ, by
employing an evidently-vague pronoun reference, Cocke displays an orientation to
proper scientific skepticism. For their observation to represent a credible scientific
discovery, it must be demonstrated to be a real finding and not an artifact. Claiming
something to be a discovery before ruling out other explanations would be inconsistent
with the behavior of a competent scientist. Cocke, therefore, is demonstrating his
alignment with and adherence to, the known procedures by which the referential work of
scientific discovery is done. In other words, by stating the claim as a question and then
offering his own response (“Can’t be.”), he is displaying an orientation to proper
disciplinary skepticism. His formulation can be seen, therefore, as an elegant solution to
an interactional dilemma—how does one raise the possibility of a claim without actually
making one? We see in it the everyday work of accountably producing science.
Transforming the Proposal to a Discovery-Achieved
We also see revealed the sequential organization of a discovery-in-progress. It
begins with a noticing or reporting, one that orients attention to some feature of the
environment, but without claiming a discovery. The discovery proposal, which follows
and with which we have concerned ourselves centrally here, raises the possibility of a
discovery, but again without specifying exactly what the discovery might be. It projects a
discovery to be, but it’s status as a proposal-for-a-possible-discovery is only made
evident in retrospect. Garfinkel et al. wrote, “the optically discovered pulsar is
accountably contingent upon further activities which are projected in an interactionally
occasioned manner” (p. 154). When Disney proposes, “We’ll have to figure out what the
hell this means now” (line 23), he anaphorically references the possible discovery
proposed by Cocke. How the proposal-for-a-possible-discovery was transformed to a
discovery-realized was the central focus of the Garfinkel et al. study. Referring to the
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researchers’ night’s work, they wrote, “their unavoidably ‘situated’ practices become
progressively witnessable-and-discourse-able as ‘the-exhibitable-astronomicalanalyzablity-of-the-pulsar-again’” (p. 134).
The phenomena described here (Sacksian ITs, prospective indexicals, RPQs) are
not the special province of astrophysicists and scientists. They arise routinely and
ubiquitously in everyday interaction. They are matters that hide in plain sight. When
pointed out, however, they are easily recognized by all. Here we examine precisely how
they were placed into service in the work of carrying out a discovery. Such methods are
remarkably well suited to the practicalities of discussing things in the process of being
discovered. We see how their use is ably fitted to the task of displaying understandings
of just what it is being done in the moment. We find in them not only new insights into
the practicalities of discovery work, but also a window onto the basic processes through
which understanding itself is produced.

DISCOVERING THE PHYSICS OF MOTION
Using terms and concepts developed by Garfinkel et al. in their description of the
discovery of the optical pulsar, we will now return to our principal project, that of reexamining the Roschelle data using a different analytic framing. Dana and Carol were
volunteers in a study in which subjects worked in pairs to complete a series of 17
problems (the “EM Challenges”) by conducting experiments in the simulation
environment. These experiments were ‘mock-ups’ in a double sense—not only were the
students called upon to re-discover well-established scientific facts, but they were also
doing so in a simplified and idealized ‘microworld.’xii Each experiment took the form of a
simulation run and the students might conduct multiple runs in the course of solving any
particular challenge. The problems were done over two work periods scheduled on two
consecutive days as an after-school activity. The materials that formed the basis for the
current analysis consisted of the description of the research protocol in Roschelle’s
(1991) dissertation, the transcripts of the five “Episodes” in Roschelle’s (1992) published
analysis, and 9 video clips provided to us by Roschelle. Roschelle’s analysis focused on
approximately 3 min. of interaction that occurred while the students solved two particular
EM problems. They encountered these two challenges about 15 min. into their second
day of participation in the study. The first three video clips captured the students’ work
on the first of these challenges up to and including its solution. The camera was position
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behind the students shooting toward the computer screen. It caught the action on the
screen as well as the students’ points and gestures in front of the computer. Clips #4
and #5 represented their post-solution reflection. The students moved on to the second
challenge in Clip #6 and continued to work on it through Clips #7 and #8. We never
actually see the final simulation run for the second challenge. Clip #9 represented an
interview conducted shortly after they produced a solution to the second problem.
Transcripts for the nine clips can be found in Appendix C.

Evidence of a Discovery-Achieved
Like the astrophysicists described by Garfinkel et al., Dana and Carol advanced
through a “developing sequence of locally pointed noticings” (p. 149). Though they did
not publish a report in Nature, at the conclusion of the second analyzed problem Dana
did exclaim “Oh my god! It’s all so much clearer now!” (Clip #7, 3:32:26). This would
seem to suggest that something had happened; that somehow a new understanding had
been developed. But, what was the referent of it and how did it become clarified?
Using the same analytic approach employed in the optical pulsar example, we seek
evidence of a discovery achieved and then, using this formulation as a guide, trace back
through the participants’ talk to locate where the matter discovered initially entered the
conversation. Our attention is again directed to the discovery proposal as a focal point
for our analysis. Oddly, while the analysis of the discovery of optical pulsar was
relatively straightforward, we find that Dana and Carol’s discoveries in the highly
simplified world of the Envisioning Machine to be considerably more complex.
The procedure in Roschelle’s study called for the student pairs to be interviewed
every time they completed a few challenges (Roschelle, 1991). The interviews were
free-form and the students were required to explain how their solutions worked. Shortly
after completing the two challenges analyzed in the article, Roschelle approached the
pair and asked, “So, could you explain to me how it works?” (See Clip #9 in Appendix
C). His question presupposed several things. First, that the simulation runs operated in
an orderly and accountable fashion, that is that the simulations behaved according to
some underlying explanatory principle. Second, that the principle operated in essentially
the same way across the problems. Third, that the principle, whatever it might be, could
be articulated in mutually intelligible ways. And finally, the question presupposed that
they, the students, had both the capacity and obligation to produce this articulation.
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Producing an explanation, therefore, was an important and understood aspect of their
participation. To do it, Dana and Carol needed to determine which features within the
dynamically unfolding scene before them to which they needed to attend (and those that
they needed to disregard). Their task, in short, was one of rendering the EM display as
legible.
Several observations might be made with regard to the design of Roschelle’s query.
It begins with the particle so. Raymond (2004) has described how, when used to initiate
a turn at talk, so “does not itself begin an action so much as invoke the continuing
relevance of one” (p. 210). Coming at the conclusion of the pair’s most recent problem
solving session, Roschelle’s opening both references that activity and makes it relevant
as a topic. It is structured as a simple yes-no question. Much has been written about
how such queries can be employed in pedagogical settings (Koshik, 2005; Hutchby,
2005), settings in which questions are asked for which the answers are often known
(Mehan, 1979). Roschelle’s question, though having the form of a simple yes-no
question, was neither simple nor do we have any reason to believe that the answer was
known. His query was open-ended and provided great latitude with respect to how one
might go about answering it. Note its similarity to “Rose’s gloss” (Garfinkel & Sacks,
1970). By leaving the reference of it deliberately vague he leaves it as a task for the
students to work out just what it might mean. But by this arrangement, he too is obliged
to seek the identity of the evidently-vague IT in the students’ response.
Cocke and Disney’s discovery came at the conclusion of months of careful
preparation. Though the discovery required special instrumentation, a firm grasp of prior
research and complex calculations, their ultimate finding proved to be a simple one—
optical pulsars exist. Carol and Dana, on the other hand, came to the problem with
considerably less preparation and advanced expectations. Lacking a background in
calculus and physics, they also lacked a specialized vocabulary for discussing what they
had found. Their account of their discovery was complex, verbose, confusing, and
remarkably creative. They used their bodies to help reproduce what they had seen and
discovered. Carol self-selected to begin and offered the following response:
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Excerpt 3 (Clip #9: 3:55:34–3:55:58)
132 Carol:

Yeah, I could show if: (1.2) you have the (0.3)

133

light arrow and the black arrow? (1.6) ahm:

134

(0.7) The light arrow’s tip moves along the

135

line of the black arrow and stops (0.3) at the

136

end of the black arrow like

137 Dana:

And then

137 Carol:

(It hinges/like) it moves (0.7) like from the

138

ball like that if that was like an axes if that

139

was like (.) a hinge or something? And it moves

140

along the line of the black arrow and stops

141

(0.7)

142 Dana:

And then like continues (0.6) as the path:

143 Carol:

at the tip and then it goes that way (.) as

144

the (path/thin) arrow

In an EM simulation run, two objects, a black and white ball, travel across the screen
each leaving a trail of dots (see Fig. 2). For each ball, the dot trail revealed not only the
path taken, but also, in the spacing of the dots, the speed with which it traveled. The
nature of each EM challenge was to make the trail produced by the white ball match that
of the black. The white ball was drawn with a thin arrow (“light arrow”) indicating its
instantaneous speed and direction. The initial position, speed, and direction of the white
ball could be set by moving the ball itself and/or manipulating this arrow. Those familiar
with calculus will recognize the arrow as representing a velocity (vel) vector. A second
vector, drawn with a darker line (“black arrow”) represented acceleration (acc).xiii Unlike
velocity, which could only be set at the beginning of the simulation run, acceleration
could be applied in 1 sec. pulses at pre-specified points within the simulation. The acc
vector was drawn with its tail positioned at the tip of the vel vector.
<<Insert Figure 2 about here>>
The simulation screen, in its design, offered a dynamic representation of a number
of abstract principles of Newtonian mechanics. It instructed a certain way of thinking
about motion that was made concrete in the dot trails, the vectors, the VSD animation,
etc. The design of the activity and the individual challenges also directed the students’
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attention to what parts of the environment stood in need of explanation. In the two
challenges analyzed here, for example, only the acc vector needed to be manipulated to
produce a solution. This also implied, however, that the acc vector played some sort of
role in what we have been referring to as the underlying explanatory principle.
By way of a response to Roschelle’s query, Carol produced a gestural animation of
the behavior of the vel and acc vectors during a simulation run (see Roschelle’s [1992]
description, pp. 259-262). It was not the behavior of the vel and acc vectors attached to
the white ball that she depicted, however, but rather the behavior of the vectors as
reproduced in the lower, left-hand corner of the screen. To help students better
visualize what was happening in the simulation, a special graphic, known as the Velocity
Space Display (VSD), was provided there. It was an animation of the “vector addition
triangle” (Roschelle, 1992, p. 261) familiar to all students of calculus-based physics. The
vel vector in the VSD had the same length and direction as the vel vector attached to the
white ball, but its point of origin was fixed. During an impulse period (Fig. 3c), the tip of
the vel vector in the VSD traveled along the length of the stationary acc vector. When
the period ended, the acc vector disappeared, but a dot trail remained in the VSD
revealing the path of the tip of the vel vector (Fig. 3d). This differed from the behavior of
the two arrows that traveled with the white ball in the simulation (Roschelle, personal
communication). The tip of this vel vector remained fixed to the tail of the acc vector
(see Fig. 3b) which was mobile during the impulse period (see Fig. 3c). At the
completion of the impulse, the acc vector, like the acc vector in the VSD, disappeared,
but, in this case, left no trail of dots (see Fig. 3d).
<<Insert Figure 3 about here>>
The analysis at this point becomes more complex. Whereas in the discovery of the
optical pulsar, we had only an audio record to study, here we have video recordings.
Carol and Dana produce their understandings as embodied matters making it necessary
to describe not only their vocal interaction, but also their gestures, gaze and interaction
with the computer.
Carol reenacted the actions of the vel and acc vectors in the VSD using the index
fingers of her right and left hand, respectively (see Fig. 4). She performed this
demonstration with her back turned toward her audience, so that her perspective (and
that of her audience) was the same as if all three were viewing it on the computer
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screen. As she performed this reenactment, she provided a running narrative account
(“the light arrow’s tip moves along the line of the black arrow”). Carol employed the
simile of a hinge (“like a hinge or something”). Her elaboration “like from the ball” is
interesting. Her gestural animation of the behavior of the vectors corresponded to the
behavior of the vectors in the VSD, but her phrasing located the pivot point around which
the vel vector rotated at the ball. Her formulation, therefore, implicitly treated the two
sets of vectors, the vectors of the VSD and the vectors that travel with the white ball, as
equivalent with respect to this pivoting action. She completed her formulation with a
statement that is difficult to catch. Roschelle transcribed it as “it goes that way as the
thin arrow.” This makes sense in terms of the description she had been constructing,
but we have trouble hearing the modifier as “thin.”
<<Insert Figure 4 about here>>

Dana had attempted to build onto Carol’s formulation at lines 137 and 143, but was
cut off both times. She began again as follows:
Excerpt 4 (Clip #9: 3:55:54–3:56:14)
143 Dana:

And then like continues (0.6) as the path:

144 Carol:

at the tip and then it goes that way (.) as

145

the (thick) arrow

146

(0.7)

147 Dana:

It like changes the path: >like if< (0.4) this

148

is the black arrow and this is the light one

149

(0.4) it like goes up (0.6) and then when you

150

change it (0.4) when you put the arrow down it

151

like goes along that

and it gets here =

yeah

152 Carol:
153 Carol:

= Yeah. It stays hinged to the ball >where

154

ever the ball is<
Yeah.

155 Dana:
156

stays hinged and then it starts going like

157

that.
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Dana constructed a reenactment of her own, setting up her right hand to serve as a
vertically-positioned acc vector and her left as a horizontally-positioned vel vector (see
Fig. 5).

Her gestures were performed in front of her face as she turned toward her

audience. While Carol’s formulation of “how it works” focused on the change in
orientation (“it hinges”) of the vel vector, Dana’s reenactment directs attention to the
altered path of the ball. She demonstrated in this way how the manipulation of the acc
vector resulted in a particular trajectory of the ball.
<<Insert Figure 5 about here>>
Dana and Carol’s accounts are clearly related, but they are not necessarily the
same. By offering a second account Dana simultaneously presents her formulation as
distinct and marks her interlocutor’s as incomplete. Carol contested this by intervening
in Dana’s ongoing gestural reenactment. She placed her hand on Dana’s right wrist (see
Fig. 6), demonstrating just where the hinging occurred, and recapitulated her account
(lines 153-154). Dana, taking the final word, conceded the validity of Carol’s treatment
(“yeah it stays hinged”) but then re-asserted her own.
<<Insert Figure 6 about here>>
Unlike the optical pulsar example where a simple proposal (“You don’t suppose
that’s really it, do you?”) was developed and elaborated over multiple observations, we
find here a plurality of noticings that have not yet been fully integrated. Carol and Dana
have each described certain regularities in the behavior of the simulation, but they may
not be the same. Taking their response to Roschelle’s query as the close of our analytic
episode, we have yet to establish where it begins. Our task, therefore, is to locate where
these noticings first emerged in the conversation. Before reading our analysis, however,
we suggest that you might first want turn to Appendix C and develop your own theory
about where Carol and Dana produced a proposal (or proposals) for a possible
discovery. Doing so will help familiarize you with the data and put you in a better position
to evaluate the claims of the sections that follow (cf., McDermott, Gospodinoff, & Aron,
1978).
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Locating a Proposal-for-a-Possible-Discovery, Part 1
In the recordings provided to us, the hinge-action metaphor (“on its hinge”) first
appears in Clip #4 and its production is a bit of a mystery. Carol sat to the left (looking
toward the screen) and Dana to the right. Dana was in control of the mouse. The
keyboard was pushed to the side out of reach. They were in the midst of working on the
first of the two EM challenges analyzed by Roschelle (1992). In this problem, the dark
ball initially had a horizontal trajectory and then veered 45° off its prior course toward the
bottom of the screen (see Fig. 3d). We find the following exchange:
Excerpt 5 (Clip #5: 3:30:32–3:30:57)
39

Dana:

Now you’re saying this is the black arrow?

40

Carol:

Yeah.

41

Dana:

And it pulls it the other arrow on its

42
43

hinge.
On its

Carol:

44

hinge. It pulls the other arrow on the hinge

45

down to the tip of the black arrow.

46

(1.3)

47

Dana:

Making the line that you see here?

48

Carol:

Right.

As we see, the hinge-pulling metaphor was produced in unison by Dana and Carol (lines
41-44). We can only speculate how both parties converged on the same formulation at
precisely the same time. Given that the recording occurs on their second day working
with the EM, maybe this was a metaphor that one of them had introduced earlier and
was now a local convention for discussing this action of the arrow. Alternatively, maybe
this concordance merely reflected the fact that this was just the most obvious and
natural way for them to describe the phenomenon as they understood it. We don’t know.
A more critical question to the current analysis pertains to Dana’s “and it pulls it”
(line 41). What sense can we make of this construction? Her extended turn was
presented as a check on a proposal offered by Carol (lines 34-38) in a previous
exchange provided below:

Do not distribute or cite without permission

23

DISCOVERIES AS OCCASIONED PRODUCTIONS
Excerpt 6 (Clip #4: 3:30:17–3:30:34)
30

Dana:

What I don’t understand is ho::w (0.2) the

31

length thing (0.3) the (0.2) positioning of

32

that arro::w

33

(1.5)

34

Carol:→(.hh)OU:H, you know what I think it is?

It’s

35

like the li::ne, (0.3) that

arrow it’s the

36

li::↑ne of where it pu:lls that down >like

37

see< how that makes this dotted line↑ .hhh

38

that was the black arrow (.) it pu::lls it.

The subject of Dana’s utterance (lines 30-32) in the beginning of this exchange is only
made clear by her gesture with the cursor performed after the utterance’s completion.
Though not grammatically constructed as a question, Dana’s utterance is heard as a
request for information.
Carol’s response begins with the particle oh. Jefferson (1978) described how ohprefacing can be used as a “disjunct marker” (p. 221), that is as an indication to the
listener that the utterance to follow is not “topically coherent with prior talk” (p. 246).
Without oh-prefacing, Carol’s turn at line 34 would appear in a slot where a response to
Dana’s request for information might be relevant. Instead, her utterance is heard as
triggered by something other than what came before; the oh-prefacing “injects an
extraconversational contingency, adumbrated by the particle and subsequently [to be]
elaborated upon, into the talk” (Heritage, 1984, p. 300). Further, oh-prefacing appears to
do a very particular kind of work:
Evidence from the placement of the particle in a range of conversational
sequences shows that the particle is used to propose that its producer has
undergone some kind of change in his or her locally current state of knowledge,
information, orientation or awareness. (p. 299)
Heritage warns us, however, not to take the change-of-cognitive-state notion too literally:
[T]he utterance of oh is a point event, whereas a change of cognitive state is
likely a processual one that dawns, emerges and consolidates. Additionally, like
‘ouch’, oh can be withheld in the face of its corresponding cognitive event, or
produced in the absence of such an event… (Heritage, 2005, p. 201)xiv
Though it cannot, therefore, be counted upon as a reliable index into what the
participants are holding in their heads, oh-prefacing has consequences for the unfolding
conversation. Heritage (1984) observed that its deployment is “informative for other
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participants and is implemented in, or accomplice to, the achievement of a variety of
interactional tasks” (p. 299).
In this way, Carol’s opening projects a report by the speaker of the speaker’s
understanding of some matter. Her proposal not only marks a shift in topic, but also
marks that which is to come as a newly-developed understanding. Given that Carol’s
turn appears in a position in which a response to Dana’s request for clarification might
be relevant, one might naturally presume that it ties back to Dana’s “length thing.” What
we find instead is our old friend the Sacksian IT. Rather than referencing a prior
antecedent, it projects forward; it is a prospective indexical. We also see here the power
of evident vagueness. The ambiguity of reference gives Carol considerable flexibility for
how she might formulate her new understanding.
If her proposal does not tie back to Dana’s concern, however, to what might it refer?
Just prior to the exchange captured in Excerpt 6, Dana had conducted a run using a
particular setting of the acc vector (see Clip #3 in Appendix C). This setting happened to
work for the challenge that they were in the process of solving, but Dana expressed
uncertainty about just why it worked. She observed, “But it doesn’t go down at a ninety
degree angle I don’t understand” (lines 26-27). In this way, Dana had, prior to Excerpt 6,
posed a puzzle with regard to the direction of the resultant vector. Though she
subsequently raised an additional concern pertaining to the magnitude of this same
vector (“what I don’t understand is how the length thing …”), Carol’s proposal appears to
address the former issue. Dana’s reporting, “it doesn’t go down at a ninety degree
angle,” like Disney’s “we’ve got a bleeding pulse here,” provides the starting materials for
the construction of a discovery proposal.
The presentation of Carol’s proposal (lines 34-38) is complex. At its heart is a
simple noticing that is repeated twice—“it pulls that down” (line 36) and, in more
condensed form, “it pulls it” (line 38). The object of the pulling has already been
described, though it is not specified until Excerpt 5. In this excerpt, which actually
followed Excerpt 6, we find a third and expanded version of Carol’s noticing, “it pulls the
other arrow on its hinge down to the tip of the black arrow” (lines 44-45). The question
remains, however, what is the agent of the pulling? That is, what is the referent of the
initial it in both expressions?
In terms of positioning, the first noticing (lines 38-39) comes after the clause “that
arrow it’s the line of where [it pulls that down].” The reference to “that arrow” is
accompanied by a point to the acc vector in the VSD. Similarly, the second formulation
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was prefaced by “that was the black arrow [it pulls it].” In both cases, therefore, the
antecedent for the subject would seem to be the acc vector in the VSD, but this can’t be
right. This vector temporarily appeared in the VSD during the acceleration impulse, but
subsequently was replaced by a dotted line. It was stationary while the vel vector was
being re-oriented. Carol’s formulations of the noticing are in each case accompanied by,
what Roschelle terms, a “grasp-and-drag” gesture performed in front of the screen (see
Roschelle [1992], pp. 243-245). Her gesture resembled the act of pinching a small
object and then sliding it downward. Clearly this pulling action could not be done by “the
black arrow,” not the black arrow in the VSD at any rate.xv We have here, therefore,
another evidently vague reference, one that leaves room for later elaboration and
specification. The status of Carol’s announcement as a proposal for a new
understanding is secured only later when we (and they) eventually come to recognize
what that understanding might be.
Earlier, we argued that Cocke’s deployment of an evidently-vague pronoun
reference displayed an orientation to canonical science, one that reflected proper
disciplinary reserve. Are we to assume that Carol’s usage here achieves the same
purpose? Not likely. Evidently-vague reference is apparently a device that is used in
many places to serve many different purposes. In the current context, it would appear to
simply provide Carol with a means of referencing something that she has noticed, but for
which she has not yet acquired a technical vocabulary with which to otherwise describe.
Dana’s clarifying question (line 47, Excerpt 5) linked the hinge-pulling metaphor to
the path of the white ball. What got misplaced in this exchange, however, was Dana’s
original concern with the “length thing.” As we will see, this concern will lead to a new
noticing and an additional discovery proposal, this time from Dana.
Locating a Proposal-for-a-Possible-Discovery, Part 2
Having successfully reproduced the behavior of the black ball in the first problem,
the students moved on to the next EM challenge (see Clip #6 in Appendix C). As the run
began, the white ball was positioned just below the black. The initial velocity was the
same for both balls. Mid-run, the black ball began to execute a right-angle turn toward
the bottom of the screen (see Fig. 7). A 1 s. acceleration vector was also applied to the
white ball at this moment, but the acc vector had the same orientation as the initial vel
vector, resulting in an increase in velocity along the ball’s initial path (“It speeded up.
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Did you see that?”). To satisfy the challenge, therefore, the students needed only to
adjust the orientation for the acc vector. Most of the parameters were already in place.
<<Insert Figure 7 about here>>
For this challenge, Carol had taken a turn controlling the mouse. As she
enunciated “Let’s reset,” she restarted the simulation from the beginning, but this time
set to pause at the beginning of the impulse period. The following exchange occurred as
they conducted their second simulation run:
Excerpt 7 (Clip #6: 3:31:44–3:31:59)
82

Dana:

Now watch the bottom arrow.

83

lengthened. (0.9) But how::,

84

(0.6)

85

Dana: → Look look it gets lengthened tah OH: ((slaps

86
87

Look it, it gets

table twice)) I got it!
(It gets speeded up.)

Carol:

88

(0.4)

89

Carol:

90

Dana: → When you add on this arrow (.) it’s the length

91

What?

of the total (.) that it it assumes

Here we have a double reporting. Dana begins with a noticing, “Now watch the bottom
arrow. Look it, it gets lengthened” (lines 82-83). Her “but how” (line 83) seems to
represent a return to her previous request for clarification pertaining to the “length thing”
(lines 30-32, Excerpt 6). She reiterated the noticing in line 85, this time with an
accompanying gesture. As she enunciated “it gets lengthened,” Dana performed a
gesture with the index finger of her right hand drawing it from the tail of the vel vector in
the VSD to the tip of the acc vector. Following Drew’s (1984) account of speaker
reportings, Dana reports something seen, but does not elaborate on what it might imply
for their current understanding. The two noticings serve as prologue to her subsequent
proposal.
We have already commented on the importance of oh-prefacing with regard to
Carol’s earlier discovery proposal (lines 37-41, Excerpt 6). Dana began line 85 as an
animated demonstration, but then abruptly shifted into a different organization. Her
utterance assumes the shape of what Terasaki (2004), in her description of news
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delivery sequences, referred to as a “Pre-Announcement First” (PAF). Like ohprefacing, use of a pre-announcement structure provides an apparatus for managing
participants’ understandings. According to Terasaki, pre-announcements consist of a
two-part pair. They have the following signature format:
Pre-Announcement First: “I got it!”
Solicit Turn: “What?”
Announcement: “When you add on …”
In the first part, the PAF, one party indicates that they have knowledge that is likely to
come as news for the other. If the other party wishes to learn what the news might be,
they request it in the second pair-part or Solicit Turn and the news gets delivered. The
pre-announcement, therefore, serves to create a lexical environment whereby the
announcement will be recognized as news. If this is true, however, how then is the PAF
made recognizable as such? Terasaki argued that, “it is the presence of sequentiallyimplicative pro-forms and verbs which in part account for recipient’s recognition of an
item as a Pre-Announcement First” (p. 201). PAFs such as “You know what?” or “Guess
what?” set up for the staged delivery of a piece of news by announcing its availability
without revealing specifically what the news might be. They are, in short, designed to be
evidently vague. Dana’s Sacksian IT (line 86) accomplishes the same here and makes
relevant a Solicit Turn from Carol (line 89). In this way, the pre-announcement structure
provides a framework for the subsequent production of a discovery proposal.xvi
The initial clause of her announced proposal (“When you add on this arrow”) was
accompanied with a point to the acc vector in the VSD. Then as she enunciated “it’s the
length of the total,” Dana repeated her gesture of line 85. She left ambiguous what the
referent of it (the resultant vel vector attached to the ball, the vel vector in the VSD) in
“that it it assumes” might be.
Dana, by offering a possible alternative treatment, presents her formulation as
different from Carol’s prior proposal and marks it as potentially incomplete. In the talk
that followed, Carol contested these implications:
Excerpt 8 (Clip #6: 3:31:55–3:32:06)
90

Dana:

of the total (.) that it it assumes

91
92

When you add on this arrow (.) it’s the length

Carol:

That’s what I’m
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93

saying (0.3) is that the black arrow pulls out

94

this arrow >that’s just what I was saying<

95

(0.3) to its tip

96

Dana:

97

Carol:

98

Oh well I
But (0.2) you were doing it >saying it in a
different way.< (0.4) So

Carol here claimed ownership of Dana’s noticing (lines 92-95). She began by repeating
her previous “it pulls it” observation (Excerpt 6), in a fully expanded form, “the black
arrow pulls out this arrow.” As she spoke, she re-positioned the cursor over the top of
the VSD. On “this arrow,” she drew the cursor through the tip of the vel vector; on “to its
tip” she traced the length of the acc vector from its tail to its tip. This articulation of her
theory about the action of the vectors, however, was prefaced by a challenge to Dana’s
formulation. She asserted “that’s what I’m saying,” which she then repaired to “that’s
just what I was saying.” Carol’s shift to the past tense creates a slight distance from her
previously articulated theory. Placing her own formulation in the past also bestowed
primacy upon it. She, therefore, sought to downgrade Dana’s contribution from an
alternative proposal to a mere re-formulation (“you were … saying it in a different way”)
of her own prior proposal.
On the surface, the two noticings do not appear to be equivalent at all. The VSD
had not been a part of the screen when the students did their first day of problem solving
using the EM.xvii Their respective proposals directed attention to different features of this
display. For one thing, Dana’s formulation involves addition;xviii Carol’s “pulling.” Further,
in elaborating on her proposal, Carol had directed attention, through the hinge-pulling
metaphor, to the effect of the acc vector on the direction of the resultant velocity. The
metaphor, in this way, stressed rotation around a fixed axis, not a change in magnitude.
By producing them as equivalent, Carol enriched her own theory so that “pulling” now
pertained, not only to a change in angle, but also change in length. At the same time, it
integrated their individual contributions and resolved Dana’s open issue about the
“length thing.” Note the pronoun usage in “saying it in a different way.” The evidently
vague reference provides ample scope for accommodating the yet to be fully articulated
explanatory principle.
Not only did their proposals stand in need of reconciliation, but their noticings with
regard to the VSD also needed to be connected to or reconciled with the behavior of the
white ball. Dana had made an effort in this direction in Excerpt 5 when she observed,
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“Making the line that you see here” (line 47). The enunciation of here in that excerpt was
coordinated with a cursor point to the white ball’s dot trail. It leaves as an open question,
however, we get from Dana’s “it pulls it” noticing and Carol’s “length thing” to Dana’s
summation in Excerpt 4, “[i]t like changes the path” (line 147).
Transforming the Proposal(s) to a Discovery-Achieved
Following Excerpt 8, Carol and Dana continued to work toward finding a solution for
the second problem. Their discussion was nicely summarized by Roschelle (1992, pp.
254-257). In the earlier excerpts, Carol and Dana constructed the “it pulls it” and the
“length thing” formulations through a combination of talk and gesture. Their pointing was
performed either with the cursor or directly using their hands. Here, however, Carol was
performing instrumental actions—using the mouse to select and drag the tip of the acc
vector—as she narrated her actions. In this way, she provisionally and publicly offered a
solution to the second problem. At the same time, she produced a third formulation, one
that integrated the action of the vectors with the motion of the ball. The exchange
proceeded as follows:
Excerpt 9 (Clip #8: 3:33:03–3:33:14)
112 Carol:
113 Dana:

Right it does.
That’s perfect!
It travels right along that

114 Carol:
115

edg:e.

116

that edg:e until (0.4) there. (0.6) Cuzz that

117

will make it come (.) down straight.

118

will travel along that edge =

119 Dana:

= yeah =

120 Carol:

= Until it’s straight there =

(0.5) So we want it to travel along
See it

Carol’s new formulation, which began as “it travels right along that edge” was repeated
three times, each time as a demonstration. As she articulated, “It travels right along that
edge” (lines 114-115), she traced with the mouse from the tail of the acc vector to its tip.
The identity of the pronoun reference seems clear—we are talking about the tip of the
vel vector as it was transformed during the impulse period. She reproduced with her
gesture the action of VSD animation. When she repeated the formulation (lines 115116), she depressed the mouse button, selecting the tip of the acc vector, while
articulating edge, and released the button on there. The production of there was
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delayed until she had moved the tip to its new position. Having dragged and
repositioned the tip of the acc vector, Carol then offered the following explanation, “cuzz
that will make it come down straight” (lines 116-117). Curiously, her action with the
cursor went up at this point, marking a line from the tip of the acc vector to the center of
the white ball. This line represented the projected course of the ball (in reverse).
Suggesting that the it, in “cuzz that will make it come down” might refer to the ball. She
then returned to her formulation and repeated the gesture of tracing from the tail of the
acc vector to its tip.
Over the course of Carol’s long turn at talk (lines 117-118, 120), the referent of the
indefinite pronoun is left evidently vague. Her talk and gestures leave it ambiguous
whether she is talking about the tip of the vel vector, the dot trail of the white ball, or the
ball itself. When she observes, however, “that will make it come down straight” (lines
116-117), she appears to be referring to the target behavior of the white ball. Though
Carol’s “See it will travel along that edge” offers a new way of viewing the screen, we do
not treat it as another discovery proposal. It incrementally builds upon Carol’s earlier
proposal pertaining to the direction of the resultant (Excerpt 6, lines 34-38) and Dana’s
proposal concerning its magnitude (Excerpt 7, line 90-91), while helping to clarify their
significance. At the same time it provides a bridge linking these proposals to the
behavior of the white ball. It also provides a bridge connecting these proposals to
Dana’s subsequent description of their discovery (“It like changes the path, ” “it like goes
along that,” Excerpt 4).xix In this way, the behavior of the vectors (both those attached to
the white ball and those in the VSD) was tied to the modified path of the white ball.
Bridges can be traversed in both directions, however, and we see here the
prospective/retrospective character of a discovery-in-progress.

DISCOVERIES AS OCCASIONED PRODUCTIONS
We introduced here a way of analyzing the work of the discovery, an approach that
treats a discovery as an occasioned production. It proceeds stepwise from the
identification of some matter discovered, working backwards to see just where that
matter entered the conversation and, finally, tracing the transformation from a proposal
for a possible discovery to discovery achieved. This approach incorporated key ideas
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from the Garfinkel et al. report, but employed a somewhat different analytic framing. We
applied this approach both to the audio recordings of the discovery of an optical pulsar
and to Roschelle’s EM data. But, what have we learned from this exercise?
We found first that the procedure for introducing a possible discovery is a
negotiated and collaborative one. Proposals for a possible discovery, i.e. utterances
within which the possibility of a discovery is initially raised, occur in environments in
which mutual attention has been directed through a prior reporting. Such proposals do
not, therefore, appear deus ex machina. In two of the three cases described here, the
reporting and the proposal were produced by different speakers. In all cases, the
proposal was constructed using discussables provided by the prior reporting. Though it
seems logically possible that these two forms of communicative effort (attention orienting
and possibility raising) could be combined in a single utterance, we saw no cases of that
here and it would be interesting to seek out additional examples of discovery to see if
that ever occurs. We also found that discovery proposals may, on different occasions,
be packaged in quite different ways. In the case of the discovery of the optical pulsar,
we find Cocke using a RPQ, while Dana and Carol both employed a news delivery
sequence with an oh-prefaced pre-announcement for their respective proposals. Again,
it would be interesting to examine additional discovery accounts to see if these
structures are reproduced elsewhere and if (quite likely) there are yet other viable ways
of organizing a discovery proposal.
More generally we found in the Roschelle data, just as Garfinkel et al. had
described in the case of the discovery of the optical pulsar, that there is a real value to
being “evidently vague.” This is counterintuitive. Most theories of communication would
hold that mutual understanding depends upon specificity of reference. Clark and
Marshall’s (1981) model of reference repair, for example, calls for supplying new or more
specific information as a means of disambiguating unclear references. But in situations
in which some matter previously unknown becomes, through the work of discovery,
knowable, it is useful, possibly even essential, to be deliberately vague. In such
situations, transitional means of reference are needed and the Sacksian IT and the other
structures of evidently-vague reference described here can be used for that purpose.
They provide a signifying mechanism that remains open through the process of
discovery right up to the point at which it becomes ultimately realized.xx
The two papers revisited here, Garfinkel et al.’s account of the discovery of an
optical pulsar and Roschelle’s analysis of Carol and Dana’s work with the Envisioning
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Machine, can be contrasted in terms of the nature of the discoveries achieved.
Atkinson and Delamont (1977) argued that classroom science is structured to provide
“concrete display[s] of the warranted production of factual science” (p. 100). They made
a distinction between what they termed hot discovery, the outcome of situated inquiry
into some question for which no answer is current available and cold discovery,
exercises designed to reproduce previously settled inquiries. Cocke and Disney’s
collaboration at the Steward Observatory led to a hot discovery. The EM and its
associated challenges were designed with the purpose of introducing learners to the
established principles of Newtonian mechanics (Roschelle, 1991). Dana and Carol,
therefore, were doing the work of cold discovery. The value of evident vagueness would
seem to be the same regardless of whether we are talking about hot discovery or cold.
This should come as no surprise since the pragmatic requirements for talking about a
thing discovered are unchanged whether the discovery occurs under pedagogicallyarranged circumstances or in a professional laboratory. This would seem to resonate
with Lynch and Macbeth’s (1998) proposal that all discoveries, whether hot or cold,
consist in “different articulations of no less situated knowledges” (p. 294).
One thing that emerged when we positioned our description of the discovery of the
optical pulsar alongside our re-analysis of Roschelle’s data, however, was a surprise.
We found that the structure of the analysis of Dana and Carol’s discovery work was
considerably more complex than the structure of the analysis of the discovery of the
optical pulsar. This is counterintuitive given that the underlying math and science was
clearly much simpler. This is not to say that their discovery was experienced or oriented
to as more complex, but only that it presented itself for analysis as more complex.
Though the discovery of the optical pulsar required advanced planning and careful
calculations, the question to which Cocke and Disney addressed themselves was
actually a very simple one—do we have evidence of a pulsar or not? For Carol and
Dana, it was more difficult and the question that motivated their inquiry was a little more
elusive. Furthermore, their task involved producing an explanation for which they had no
ready vocabulary with which to articulate. To produce the thing as understood, they had
to invent one (“pulling like a hinge,” “the length thing”). Finally, they also had to find ways
to reconcile potentially differing accounts. Arriving at an understanding, therefore,
required more work interactionally because there was more work that needed to be
done. We might say that part of professional science’s prowess resides in its capacity to
reduce complex inquiry to clear and simple questions. Lacking the tools to make the job
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simple, Carol and Dana were left to pursue a more complicated course to constructing
their discovery. So, while we argued that Cocke and Disney used evident vagueness in
ways that displayed an orientation to scientific rigor, Dana and Carol’s use it in ways that
served the opposite purpose—it displayed their status as non-scientists.
Having now employed our method to produce accounts of how two discoveries
were occasioned, what is the reader to do with them? Of what value would our
description of Dana and Carol’s discovery be to a teacher or designer interested in
implementing discovery learning methods in a classroom? It should first be conceded
that microanalytic methods like the one demonstrated here do not lend themselves to
use within the situation of study. It would clearly be very difficult, for example, for a
teacher to analyze proposals-for-a-possible-discovery while simultaneously managing a
busy classroom! The critical details of practice are best appreciated from the outside
looking in, with repeated viewings and using carefully constructed transcripts. Though
our method may not be useful in the classroom, we would argue that the findings
produced using it might hold value for those interested in understanding instructional
practices and improving them.
Roschelle’s EM environment and its associated challenges stand as an example of
an instructional innovation. Any such innovation requires that teachers and students
produce the desired forms of practice that the innovation was designed to support.
These practices are not caused by the innovation, but must be produced in use. They
cannot be assumed, but must instead be studied as occasioned productions. The
method introduced here as a means of investigating how discoveries are produced is
one example of how the practices of producing an instructional innovation (here
discovery learning) might be studied. This leaves unanswered, however, the question of
how the praxeological accounts produced using such methods are to be read by
teachers, researchers, and designers.
A praxeological account does not so much capture a practice as provide instruction
in how it might be found. This is an important point. As a simple example, Livingston
(1987, Chaps. 2 & 4) provided a description of a service line. This is a sociallyorganized affair with which we are all very familiar. We have all observed formatted
queues, stood in lines ourselves, and know how to competently participate in their
production. However, a queue is, to borrow an expression from Garfinkel and Livingston
(2003), “a Thing-in-its-details” (p. 23). A description that fails to capture these details
runs the risk of “losing the phenomenon” (Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 264-267; also pp. 162-
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166). Garfinkel refers to those features that make something recognizable as a service
line as its “phenomenal field properties.” The goal of a praxeologic account is to make
these essential details visible. But to know how to recognize service lines and to be
able to reproduce them, one must do more than just read the descriptive account.
Garfinkel (2002) instructs,
Read these descriptions while watching a formatted queue. Do not read only this
description. And do not read this description while watching only one formatted
queue. When reading this description, tour several queues. Tour many queues.
(p. 256)
The results of an ethnomethodologically-informed study, therefore, are not to be treated
as specifications of practice, but rather as guides for locating the field properties that
make the practices recognizable for what they are. They are, in short, tutorial problems.
Turning from queues to the work of doing discovery, we now see exactly why the
Garfinkel et al. report was written in the way it was. It was written in a way that enabled
us to discover for ourselves just how a discovery was produced. When Garfinkel
described his exercises as tutorial problems he was not being pedantic. The crucial
features that make a practice recognizable for what it is, elude simple specification.
They can be discovered, however, by working through a properly designed problem. In
this way, tutorial problems, “if done properly, reveal why they were done” (Rawls, 2002,
p. 33).
We see in this how a program of practice studies in the learning sciences might
proceed. The work of uncovering the field properties of the discovery at Kitt Peak
Observatory (or Carol and Dana’s discovery in the EM environment) is similar to that of
elucidating the critical details of instruction in settings of innovation. Our project, then,
becomes one of producing praxeologic accounts of instructional practices, accounts that
are written to be read as tutorial problems.
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Endnotes
i

Roschelle described Dana and Carol’s achievement in terms of conceptual convergence. Our

unmarked shift from talking about conceptual change to talking about discovery is consistent with
usage within the learning and cognitive science communities that seems to employ these terms
interchangeably. Thagard (1992) and Dunbar (1994), for example, described scientific discovery
in terms of conceptual change. In the same vein, Strike and Posner (1985) described all learning
from a constructivist perspective as conceptual change.
ii

The foundations of CA research were presented in the Sacks (1992) lectures. Consult ten Have

(1999) or Schegloff (2006) for useful introductions to the methodology.
iii

A broader question with high relevance to the learning sciences concerns how we might adapt

our research practices to treat, not only discoveries in discovery learning, but all forms of
instruction as ‘occasioned productions’? We will return to this later.
iv

Taylor’s name was listed as the third author on the report announcing the discovery. In addition

to designing the instrument that made the discovery possible, he had participated in the
observations done on nights prior to the one on which the discovery was made and rejoined
Cocke and Disney on the evening following the discovery.
v

For additional discussion of the role of equipment in discovery practices see Latour & Woolgar,

1979; Lynch, 1985; Pickering, 1995; and Traweek, 1988.
vi

The transcription conventions are summarized in Appendix A. If this notation is unfamiliar to

you, you might find it helpful to read the transcripts aloud with a partner. Try to attend, as you do
so, to all the marked features of timing and delivery.
It has been argued that transcripts are, in their design, theory-laden (Ochs, 1979). Transcriptions
can be easily modified to conceal the identities of the subjects and readily lend themselves to
presentation on a printed page. They have, as a result, historically been the stand-in of choice for
vocal practice in the literature on language and social interaction. They work best when the
analysis focuses chiefly on talk and less well when embodied aspects of interaction are
considered. Nonetheless, they are an important tool for reconstructing an analyzed event and
that is how they are used here.
vii

Lynch (1993) reported a “brief telegram announced their findings simply by formulating the date

and time, period of the pulse, celestial coordinates, and identity of the ‘source’ star in the Crab
Nebula” (p. 213) was dispatched to other observatories around the world. Other astronomers
were soon able to replicate Cocke and Disney’s finding and locate additional examples of optical
pulsars. Lynch found it remarkable that they were able to do so using such sparse instructions.
We find it also interesting that the sighting of one optical pulsar made them suddenly visible to all.
viii

Though he does not appear in either of the quoted excerpts, it should be remembered that the

night assistant, Robert McCallester was also present on the telescope platform. While the dialog
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would suggest that Cocke and Disney were both monitoring the CAT display, we do not know if it
was also available to McCallester. There are many aspects of this activity that are unknown to
us—How were the participants positioned with regard to each other? What displays and gauges
were available to each? Were their hands free for pointing and gesture and were they used for
such? Despite these large gaps in our record, however, it is still possible to make certain
grounded claims regarding the organization of the discovery talk.
ix

Linguists refer to such verbs as copulas.

x

See Arminen (2008) for further development of this connection.

xi

For a related notion see Garfinkel and Sacks’ (1970) discussion of “Rose’s gloss” (p. 366).

While driving through a city that he was visiting, Rose looked out the window and said to his host,
“It has certainly changed.” By leaving it open in this way, Rose was able to work out just what he
was in fact looking at (and thereby specifying) by locating it in his interlocutor’s reply. As
Garfinkel and Sacks argue, the “definiteness of circumstantial particulars consists of their
consequences” (p. 366). The connection of “Rose’s gloss” to the Sacksian IT was suggested by
John Heritage.
xii

The term is borrowed from Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) who specified that something is a mock-

up precisely in the ways in which it serves to give “an account of an observable state of affairs”
(p. 263). That is, it must both provide for “an accurate representation of some relationships and
some features in the observable situation,” but, at the same time, make “specifically and
deliberately false provision of some of the essential features of the situation” (p. 263, authors’
italics).
xiii

We will refer to the light and dark arrows as the vel and acc vectors, respectively. We do as a

notational convenience, but with a certain amount of trepidation. Such labels allow us as auditors
to recover the sense of the display as an animated form of vector arithmetic. It is easy to be
seduced, however, into presuming that the participants might have also understood these
representations in this membered way. So beware.
xiv

One might note the similarities between Heritage’s description of changes in cognitive state as

“processual” and “one that dawns, emerges, and consolidates” and our earlier discussion of
discovery-in-progress.
xv

As mentioned earlier, the behavior of the vectors attached to the white ball differed in subtle

ways from the behavior of the corresponding vectors in the VSD. One could actually visualize the
acc vector that traveled with the white ball as “pulling” the tip of the vel vector (see Fig. 3). Based
on their affiliated gestures, however, Dana and Carol’s talk appears to be oriented to the vectors
in the VSD.
xvi

The alert reader might have noticed that Carol’s previously described proposal for a possible

discovery (Excerpt 6) also employed a pre-announcement structure, one in which the Solicit Turn
was pre-empted. Their proposals, therefore, had parallel organizations.
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xvii

See Dana’s turn (lines 132-138) in Clip #9 in Appendix C.

xviii

See Fig. 8 (p. 253) in Roschelle (1992).

xix

It is interesting that it was Dana, not Carol, who articulated this understanding in the debriefing

interview. This is possibly the strongest piece of evidence for the first form of convergence
described by Roschelle (1992), that is convergence of their collective understanding of what they
were doing together.
xx

We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this argument.
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